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FAILURE TO PROCEED CORRECTLY AGAINST
MINOR DEFENDANTS
OTTO MILER III*
INTRODUCTION
During the last four years the author has served as law clerk to
the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. During the last
two of those years, it was with increasing frequency that cases came
to his attention wherein he was required to make recommendations to
the judges on motions to quash, motions to dismiss, and demurrers,
all directed toward the fact that the defendant in the case was a minor
and not properly before the court. In many instances it was his
opinion that the minor was using the shield and protection afforded
him because of his minority to take undue advantage of the
plaintiff by concealing his minority until the statute of limitations in
the pending action had passed.
The purpose of this article will be to discuss dangers inherent in
not recognizing that a minor may be involved, to suggest methods of
avoiding this danger, to recommend solutions to the problem of
properly serving and identifying minors, and, finally, to recommend
some legislative reforms.
EVERY DEFENDANT IS A POTENTIAL MINOR
It may seem ludicrous to an attorney to suggest to him that in
every case there is a possibility that one or more of the defendants
may be a minor, but this seems to be the only acceptable approach.
Once he is used to accepting the idea that every defendant is a
potential minor, and uses the proper discovery procedures, the at-
torney will avoid the possibility of losing his case on a legal tech-
nicality. In this article we will review the results of a number of
recent cases on this subject wherein the plaintiff's lawyer did not ac-
cept this viewpoint and thereby lost his client's case.
One fairly recent and unreported case is still pending in Cuyahoga
Common Pleas Court.' The automobile accident which gave rise to
the lawsuit occurred on August 9, 1959. The petition was not filed
until August 9, 1961, two years later, the last day for the filing of law-
suits under the statute of limitations.2 A precipe was issued, and the
defendant was served as an adult at his residence on August 11, 1961.
* Of the firm of Burgess, Fullmer, Parker & Steck, Cleveland, Ohio. Member of
the Ohio State, Cleveland, and Cuyahoga County Bar Assodations.
1 Holes v. Holley, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, No. 756059.
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10.
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Thereafter, on September 1, 1961, a motion to quash was filed. In
the motion the defendant stated that he did not intend to enter his
appearance and objected to the jurisdiction over his person. He then
stated that he was not of age and was improperly served. Attached
to the motion to quash was an affidavit wherein the father of the
defendant stated that the son was only twenty years old. A brief was
submitted. The brief relied upon Revised Code section 2703.13, and
the cases of Fiegi v. Lopartkovich3 and Lehman v. Horning.' The
motion to quash was granted by the court on October 26, 1961.
Thereafter the plaintiff amended his petition by interlineation to show
that the defendant was a minor and requested alias service by filing a
precipe with the clerk. The sheriff re-served the defendant on
October 20, 1961, as a minor, and served his mother as guardian. The
defendant on November 10, 1961, filed a demurrer. His ground was
that the statute of limitations had passed before the petition was filed
on October 20, 1961. The court sustained the demurrer. However, it
would appear the demurrer was not correctly sustained as the face
of the petition still showed the original date of filing as August 9,
1961, and not October 20, 1961.1 The amendment was merely by
interlineation and affected the caption only. Nevertheless, the plain-
tiff's attorney apparently recognized that the case was lost for he did
nothing further. On February 9, 1962, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss for want of prosecution. This motion will undoubtedly be
granted.
This case is typical of many. In actuality, the greatest mistake
was the delay in filing until the last day. I took the liberty of inquiring
of the attorney of the plaintiff as to why he waited until the last day.
His reasons were that the client did not consult with him until three
days before the statute ran and did not tell him the defendant was a
minor. This, of course, presents problems which are extremely dif-
ficult to overcome. However, unless it is absolutely necessary, it is
suggested that no case be filed less than ninety days before the run-
ning of the statute. This should give the parties sufficient time to
force answers to the interrogatories which will be discussed later.
The above case is typical of what may and does happen in cases
wherein defendant is a minor. The preceding case is unusual in the
delay in filing only. The normal case proceeds as follows. The plain-
tiff files his case approximately one year after the accident. The
defendant is not designated a minor and is served as an adult. The
defendant then reports the service to his insurance company or his
3 38 Ohio App. 338, 176 N.E. 670 (1930).
4 100 Ohio App. 19, 135 N.E.2d 475 (1955).
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.08.
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father's insurance company. An answer is filed. The case pends until
the statute of limitations runs. Thereafter, counsel for the defendant
immediately files a motion to quash, setting forth in his affidavit the
minority of the defendant at the time he was served. He also brings
forth a long list of reported decisions supporting his affidavit.' The
result: the motion to quash is granted, and the case is lost.
Of course, each case arises a little bit differently. Sometimes the
plaintiff's counsel is obviously unobservant. One example of this is a
case which came to the attention of the author while recommending
a ruling on a motion to dismiss. It was filed on behalf of a minor
defendant who had been served as an adult. After service had been
obtained on the minor defendant as an adult, he was served with a
subpoena to appear at a deposition. During his testimony at the
deposition, he stated his age as twenty. This should have rung a bell
with the plaintiff's counsel, but it did not. He went blissfully on,
asking other questions and obtaining more information. The deposi-
tion was transcribed and filed in the case. After several months
passed, the defendant became twenty-one and at almost the same time
the statute of limitations passed. He immediately filed a motion to
quash on the basis that he was improperly served. The court was required
to comply with the request, and did so without hesitancy as the
counsel had most assuredly been aware of the age of the defendant
and had time to remedy his mistake.
The above is not always true. Often, counsel for the plaintiff is
intentionally misled. This can happen when the accident report taken
by the police officer shows the age of minor defendant to be that of
an adult. (In one instance the minor had changed his driver's license
so as to be able to be served at a bar.) This obviously misleads
counsel for the plaintiff. Thereafter, the minor defendant files an
answer as an adult, further misleading him. Counsel for the plaintiff
here should have just cause for complaint since the attorney filing
the answer knew it was not in compliance with the law.7
Another interesting example of what can transpire if a minor is
improperly served is reflected in the two Taplin cases which arose in
the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. One is still pending.'
In this instance, the plaintiff himself was a practicing attorney and
must have, due to the factual circumstances, noted the youthfulness of
the defendant.
6 Including Fiegi v. Lopartkovich, supra note 3 and Lehman v. Homing, a minor,
supra note 4.
7 Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.16 requires answers on behalf of minors to be filed by a
guardian ad litem.
S Taplin v. Kotter, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case Nos. 713454 and
759868.
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The first Taplin case was filed on September 2, 1958. It arose
out of an automobile accident which occurred on Decmeber 22, 1957.
The petition was filed by the law firm of which the plaintiff was a
member. A precipe was attached to the petition directed to the clerk
asking him to have the sheriff of Cuyahoga County return summons
according to law, and endorsed thereon petition for money only. The
sheriff made his return on September 3, 1958, stating that he had
made residence service upon the defendant. Commencing on October
2, 1958, counsel for the defendant filed several consent to plead slips,
and finally, on December 1, 1958, an answer admitting that the accident
had occurred but denying all the other allegations. The answer was
verified by counsel for the defendant. He stated that he was one of
the attorneys for the defendant, and that the defendant was absent
from Cuyahoga County. On January 21, 1960, approximately one
month after the statute of limitations had run, the defendant came
forward with a motion to quash in which he stated that service of
summons should be quashed, since service did not comply with the
statutes of Ohio providing for service on a minor. The defendant
relied upon Revised Code section 2703.13 and upon Russell v. Drake.'
On January 8, 1960, the court ruled that an alias summons having
been issued, the motion to quash service of summons should be
stricken. Thereafter on April 27, 1960, an alias summons was served.
It was at this point that the arguments of the plaintiff switched from
the fact that there had been good service to the fact that the defend-
ant had been out of the jurisdiction of the court and of the state and,
thus, that the statute of limitations had tolled.10 Counsel also stated
that it was his opinion that there was a sharp practice and that
certainly there was no legislative policy favoring such a practice under
the guise of protecting an innocent minor. The plaintiff went on to
argue that the parties were on actual notice and the defect as to
service had not been raised until months after the answer had been
filed and notices as to taking depositions had been filed. A motion to
quash the service of the alias summons was filed. New complications
arose for the sheriff had served the summons by attaching it to the
doorknob and there was no question but that service should have
been quashed." The court appeared to ignore this issue and overruled
the motion to quash alias service of summons. Thus, the defendant
was required to take additional action and on June 24, 1960, filed a
motion to dismiss. The court found that the motion to dismiss was
well taken. On September 7, 1960, a final journal entry was filed.
9 164 Ohio St. 520, 132 N.E.2d 467 (1956).
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.15.
1 Sours v. State Director of Highways, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 594, 167 N.E.2d 139 (1959).
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The journal entry states that the court found the record in the case
disclosed the minority of the defendant at the time service was
initially made and the same was void. The court further found
that the defendant was not properly served with summons before the
statute of limitations had run. The court dismissed the case.
The case was appealed, 12 but the court of appeals found no error
prejudicial to the plaintiff and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court on April 28, 1961. On October 11, 1961, the supreme court
refused to certify the record.
The plaintiff, Mr. Taplin, was persistent. On November 8, 1961,
he brought an entirely new case.' 3 In this petition he set forth the
entire background as heretofore set out and then stated that the
time for the commencement of the action had expired on October 4,
1961, that the action failed on other than its merits, and that the new
action was commenced within one year afterwards, all pursuant to
the provisions of Revised Code section 2305.19. Thereafter plaintiff
set forth his cause of action in negligence. The defendant was served.
The defendant demurred and relied upon Bobo v. Bell.'4 On March
8, 1961, the demurrer was sustained. It would appear that the plain-
tiff, though persistent, still has not met the true issue in this case,
which is whether his action would be saved because the minor was out
of the jurisdiction for such a time as to toll the statute of limitations.'5
Clarifying the question as to the unresolved issue raised above,
it would appear that the minor defendant was a student in a university
located outside Ohio, that he was a resident of Ohio, normally living
with his parents, but spending much time out of the State. Thus, the
statute of limitations during the time he was outside Ohio would be
tolled the same as it would for an adult.'6 In the proper case, these
facts could be raised by a petition. The petition could be served upon
the minor in a proper manner and he would be before the court,
even though it was filed long after the two years statute of limitations
for tort actions.' 7
From time to time it may appear that the author is displeased
with some of the results or rulings in the cases set forth. This, in
12 Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals No. 25397.
13 Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Case No. 759868.
14 Bobo v. Bell, 171 Ohio St. 311, 170 N.E.2d 730 (1960).
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.15.
16 Ibid.
'7 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.15; Stanley v. Stanley, 47 Ohio St. 225, 24 N.E. 493
(1890). The reason the Taplin case may not be the proper case is that the time spent
in a college out of the state may be within the purview of the statute. Lindsay v. Max-
well, 4 Ohio N.P. 354, 7 Ohio Dec. 273 (1897). Even though the proposed defendant is
temporarily absent from the state, residence service may be obtained.
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substance, is true. This is not meant to be a criticism of the particular
judges who made the decisions in the cases; it is merely a feeling on
the part of the author that in some instances technicalities were used
to achieve unjust results while in other cases these technicalities were
overlooked.
The former is true of a case now pending in the Cleveland
Municipal Court.' 8 There, the plaintiff sued a minor. The correct
spelling of the minor's name was "McBay." In the attorney's petition,
a typographical error changed the name to "McBoy." The minor was
served as a minor. The guardian ad litem was appointed as provided
for by statute. The guardian ad litem filed an answer in which he
admitted nothing except that the minor's name was McBay rather
than McBoy. The judge of the court 2 on his own motion, held that the
guardian ad litem did not have it within his power to admit anything
and that the admission as to the name was improper and struck the
answer. This seemed to be an extremely technical defense of the
minor by the court and, in actuality, unnecessary. This holding is
not unusual. Cases have held it is necessary to sue and serve the
minor in his correct name,' but where there is merely a typographical
error the guardian should be able to admit the correct spelling. Ohio
Revised Code section 2309.20 clearly holds that the guardian may not
make admissions which are prejudicial to the minor. The admission of
a misspelling of a name should not be held to be prejudicial. In the
usual case by relying on the provisions of Revised Code section
2309.58 the parties may amend the pleadings to correct the spelling of
a name before or after judgment. Nevertheless, counsel for the
plaintiff, having brought his action timely, retyped and reserved an
amended petition upon the minor defendant as a minor and correctly
spelled her name.
The above cases are only a few of the recent unreported decisions
in Cuyahoga County wherein the plaintff had not obtained proper
service upon a minor defendant and lost his action by reason of this
technicality. The lawyers of Cuyahoga County are not alone in making
these errors and in waiting until the statute of limitations has virtually
run out.
In one case 0 plaintiff's counsel waited until three days before the
statute of limitations had run before filing his action in personal
injuries. In that case he knew the defendant was a minor and named
him as such. Unfortunately, as in McBay, there was a misnomer, and
the sheriff made a return stating that he could not find the minor in
18 Royalton S. Burns v. Lou Marce McBay, Cleveland Municipal Court No. A-64478.
19 Lehman v. Horning, a minor, supra note 4.
20 Ibid.
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his county. It was not until some time after the statute of limitations
had passed that the plaintiff was able to amend his petition and serve
the minor in his correct name. Under the facts and circumstances set
out above, the court held that Ohio Revised Code section 2703.13
must be strictly observed before jurisdiction over the person of the
minor can be acquired. Thus, service of summons upon the minor in
the manner provided for by the Revised Code was not correct and
the trial court was correct in rendering judgment for the defendant.
The court also relied upon the case of Feigi v. LopartkovicY1
In the latter case, as in almost every case dealing with minors,
the court said that the minor cannot waive compliance with the
statutes which have been passed to protect him, that he can only be
sued and served in the manner set forth by the statutes of Ohio, and
that the suit is not deemed "commenced" until the date of the issuance
of summons, which is thereafter properly served. So long as the
minors are afforded this protection, the attorney instituting a suit must
be vigilant in seeing whether or not a minor is a party defendant and,
if so, that he does acquire jurisdiction over the minor by correctly
serving him. Not only must the minor be correctly served, but any
action he takes in a civil case must be in strict compliance with the
law. Thus, he may not proceed without the appointment of a
guardian"2 nor may he make any admissions.23 It is necessary to
distinguish as between civil cases and criminal cases because ap-
parently the courts are not so strict in protecting the rights of a minor
as to technicalities of procedure when he is charged with a crime 24
The criminal cases recognize that the juvenile, or minor, has always
received considerable protection in law, but generally get over the
technical niceties of the law by stating that the objections are to
jurisdiction of the person and not the court. Thus, in the case of
Mellott v. Alvis, Warden," the court said that even a minor can waive
jurisdiction of the person. Every civil case reported herein, however,
has held that the minor cannot waive proper service and that jurisdic-
tion over his person can only be acquired by proper and complete
service.
The only laxity, if it be that, is that the statutes as to service
on the minor and his father or guardian have at least been given a
21 There is a good general discussion of this subject in 28 Ohio Jur. 2d Infants,
§§ 63 and 64.
22 Combs v. Combs, 94 Ohio App. 509, 116 N.E.2d 601 (1950); Evans v. Evans,
81 Ohio L. Abs. 255, 161 N.E.2d 401 (1959) ; Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.16 and § 2307.17.
23 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.20.
24 Mellott v. Alvis, Warden, 109 Ohio App. 486, 162 N.E.2d 623 (1959).
2G Ibid.
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reasonable interpretation so that the minor can be served in one
county and the father in another. 6 No court to date has solved, to
the author's knowledge, the more difficult problem of service on the
minor when he is emancipated, married to another minor, living in a
single family house, and both parents, his landlord, and his employer
all reside outside the state. This problem was almost raised here in
Cuyahoga County, but since the minor was not living at his home
and was in the Army, the court accepted service upon his com-
manding officer as properly being the person having charge of the
minor.
Of course, the shoe can be on the other foot and the attorney for
the minor defendant may make mistakes in technicalities which will
bring his defendant before the court even though he did not intend
it. This generally occurs by making a general entry of appearance
after the minor has reached majority. At least one case has held that
this voluntary appearance, even if it occurs after the action is barred
by the statute of limitations, will be deemed to have cured the defect
of service unless the issue is raised by demurrer or answer 2 7
Filing a suit at the last minute or even within the last month
can be dangerous. This is true whether counsel knows the defendant
is a minor or not. It is advisable for counsel to exercise caution with
any defendant; but immediately upon learning that the defendant is
a minor, some action should be taken. In Webb v. Chandler,28 for
example, plaintiff learned in May that the defendant was a minor and
did nothing about it until September. This, obviously, wa's too long a
period to wait. When dealing with minors you must act immediately
or your case may be lost, and when you lose a case against a minor
for the reason of improper service you cannot recommence the action
on the basis that it has failed otherwise than on the merits within the
one-year period provided for by Revised section 2305.19.29 Again, it
should be noted that minority is the distinguishing feature in these
cases, and it is the language in Revised Code section 2703.13 which
the court says is mandatory. In other cases where minors are not
involved the language of the Revised Code is not construed so strongly
in favor of the defendant, the saving's clause and the manner of
service are not given such a tenuous and technical an interpretation.3 0
We, therefore, must conclude that it is most advisable for counsel
to assume that every defendant is a minor and take the necessary
26 Paeltz, a minor, v. Leonher, 78 Ohio L. Abs., 103, 151 N.E.2d 804 (1958).
27 Russell v. Drake, 164 Ohio St. 520, 132 N.E.2d 467 (1956).
28 110 Ohio App. 193, 168 N.E.2d 906 (1959).
29 Juhasz v. Corson, 171 Ohio St. 218, 168 N.E.2d 491 (1960).
30 Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc., 172 Ohio St. 402, 176 N.E.2d 410 (1961).
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precautions to avoid improper service should it turn out that the
defendant is a minor.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations Under Present Law
The strongest recommendation possible has just been made
above. Always assume that the defendant may be a minor and then
take the necessary steps to protect the interests of the plaintiff. For
example, if the claim arose out of an automobile collision, obtain the
police automobile accident report and from it attempt to discern the age
of the minor, if it is given there. Second, as with any other defendant,
do not hesitate to make inquiry of your client, the prospective plain-
tiff, as to the defendant's correct residence and general physical
characteristics. This information may be used to assist the sheriff in
making service upon a minor defendant or upon any defendant. Ask
your client: what did the person driving the car, holding the gun, etc.,
look like? Approximately how old was he? What color was his hair?
How was he dressed? Could any special physical characteristics
be noted? Did the plaintiff know the defendant before the action was
commenced? What did he know of him? Did he know of his resi-
dence? Who did he live with, etc.?
It is advisable to attempt to take the statement of a potential
defendant unless you know he is represented by counsel. Often this
step is ignored because there is insurance in the case, and counsel for
the plaintiff and the insurance company carry on negotiations relative
to settlement before suit. There is an inherent danger in this. The
negotiations may cover a considerable period of time during which
counsel is lulled by the potential offers of the insurance company to
settle the case, and, thus, he does not give the file adequate attention
from the investigative standpoint. Insurance companies generally
give as little information as possible and attempt to continue the
negotiations as long as it is thought that a settlement may be arrived at
without the hiring of defense counsel. Therefore, even during these
negotiations, plaintiff's counsel should conduct his investigation
thoroughly and learn all he can about the potential defendant.
It is then suggested that with every case counsel file inter-
rogatories. It is suggested that these interrogatories be filed pursuant
to Revised Code section 2317.07 which permits the interrogatories to
be filed separate and apart from the pleadings and requires that the
answers be given as though on cross-examination. Thus, the broadest
interpretation will be given of them. If the defendant is over the age
of ten, he will be required to answer under positive oath.31 The
31 Olenik v. Calo, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 263, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 321, 158 N.E.2d 574 (1958).
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interrogatories may ask, and should ask, the defendant's correct
name, his correct residence, his age, and then may go on to ask a
myriad of questions which are relevant to the lawsuit. It is these first
three questions which concern us, and these are questions which
should not be forgotten. The same questions should be asked if a
deposition is taken.
As noted earlier, minors, on the advise of insurance defense
attorneys, have tended in the past to conceal their age by filing
answers when not named as adults and by not following the statutes
relative to pleading by and through a guardian ad litem. It is im-
possible to answer what rights a plaintiff might have if the minor lies
in answering the interrogatories. Certainly the minor would be guilty
of perjury, but it is questionable as to whether or not counsel or the
parties would have any other rights as against the minor. One thing
that counsel can do is to insist that the interrogatories be answered by
the party and not by the counsel for the party, all as required by
statute.33 It should be further recalled that the interrogatories must
be signed by the party, and not by counsel, that they must be
answered under oath, and that the oath must be positive and not as
the affiant verily believes. This is because the interrogatories may be
used as testimony in the case, and testimony in a given case may be
given only under positive oath and not as a person verily believes.
Unfortunately, obtaining the answers to interrogatories takes
time, at least thirty days.34 Thus, if counsel is to reply on the answers
to the interrogatories to determine whether the defendant is a minor,
he not only has to have the thirty days given by statute for the filing
of the answers, but he also has to have sufficient time in which to
enforce the answers which generally is at least another forty to forty-
five days. Thus, if service is not properly obtained, there is little that
counsel can do if the statute has run. It has, therefore, been suggested
above that counsel always file suit at least ninety days before the
statute runs so as to give him sufficient time to obtain the answers to
these interrogatories and thereby have sufficient time to amend and
issue alias summons if service is not proper.
Once counsel has discerned from the answers to the interrog-
atories, or from answers given upon deposition, that the defendant
is a minor and that he has not been properly served, counsel should im-
mediately file an amended petition or amend his petition by inter-
lineation setting forth the minority of the defendant and cause a
precipe to be issued directing the clerk to have the sheriff re-serve the
32 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2307.16 and 2307.17.
33 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2309.43, 2309.45, and 2317.07.
34 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2309.44 and 2317.07.
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minor defendant and his father or mother or person under whose
care or custody he is. Counsel should also insist that a minor's answer
be filed by a guardian ad litem. As stated above, failure to appoint
the guardian ad litem and failure to have an answer filed as required
by Revised Code sections 2307.16 and 2307.17 has consistently been
held to be prejudicial error and negates the entire case.35
B. Legislative Reforms
It has long been the author's contention that the protections
afforded the minor by reason of the Revised Code should be used to
protect the minor and not be used as an unfair means of defeating a
plaintiff's rights. Often counsel for the minor takes unfair advantage
of this protection by filing an answer on behalf of a defendant who
is a minor and by filing the answer as though the minor were an adult.
In so doing the defendant's counsel is misleading the other side to its
detriment, that it is taking unfair and what should be construed as an
illegal advantage. Counsel for the defendant and for defense firms
have countered this argument by saying that the law requires them to
afford every protection possible to the minor and to any defendant,
that they did not improperly serve the minor, that this was done by
the plaintiff's counsel, that their filing the answer is proper and
normal, that it is only misleading to the extent that the service upon
the defendant was misleading, and that all this was caused by plain-
tiff's counsel and not by them. They vehemently deny that there is
anything unethical or improper in verifying and filing an answer in
behalf of a minor when they know he is a minor. However, the opposite
would appear patent to anyone disinterested in the proceedings.
Furthermore, the statutes require that the answers only be filed by
guardians ad litem 6 Thus, counsel for the defendant by filing them
ignores the statute.
It would seem that certain legislative reforms are necessary so
long as defense counsel continue to ignore these niceties and the
courts continue to strictly construe the statutes affording the minor's
protection.
It is suggested that the Revised Code be amended to contain a
provision tolling any statute of limitations when an answer is filed on
behalf of a minor by other than a guardian ad litem or when the minor
answers any interrogatories or questions on deposition by giving a
false age. This would avoid any future unfair decisions. After all,
the minor is not required to bring his action until he is an adult, and,
thus, the statute of limitations is in substance tolled against an adult
35 Evans v. Evans, supra note 22.
36 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2307.16 and 2307.17.
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when a minor does not bring his action until he reaches his majority.37
Why shouldn't the statute also be tolled as against a minor who files
an answer other than by a guardian and solely to continue the con-
cealment of his age? Obviously, it should.
During the 1961 session of the legislature, the author wrote
to the judiciary committee and pointed out this problem and said
that it was unfair for the minor to use the shield of minority as a
sword, that by being able to file an answer he was misleading the
plaintiff to his detriment, and that the answer was not filed by a
guardian ad litem as required by statute.
It was then suggested that the legislature amend certain statutes
and thereby equalize the parties, taking away the undue benefits
granted to the minor. The legislature took no action. It appears that
the entire Bar or at least those who have suffered by reason of these
actions will have to take more affirmative action during the next ses-
sion of the legislature if anything is to be done to remedy this situa-
tion.
37 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.16.
